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**SUBJECT: Report on the Fourth Coordination Conference
(19-21 June)**

1. The Fourth Coordination Conference (19-21 June), under the auspices of the National Interdepartmental Seminar, brought together sixty-six senior officers from State, Defense, USIA, AID, and CIA whose duties relate in some way to training programs in overseas internal defense or counterinsurgency.

2. The conferees included the following ambassadors: Elbridge Durbrow, State Department adviser to the Air University; E. Allen Lightner, Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs, National War College; T. K. Wright, State Department adviser to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; Thomas S. Estes, State Department adviser to the Naval War College. Others who attended included C. Tyler Wood, Special Assistant to the Administrator for AID; Raymond G. Leddy, Diplomatic Adviser to the Army War College; Rear Admiral H. S. Monroe, Commander of the Amphibious Training Command, U. S. Amphibious Base; Brigadier General Royal Reynolds, Director of the Military Assistance Institute; and Brigadier General A. H. Smith, Headquarters South Command, Director, Operations.

3. The mornings were devoted to lectures by high officials of the Government, while afternoons were spent in small group discussions of training problems. It was generally agreed that the conference was worthwhile and that it should be continued each year. One basic conclusion emerged from the afternoon discussions - that the training

efforts with which the conferees are concerned suffer from a lack of overall coordination and clearly defined guidance from the top levels of the Government.

4. The outstanding lecture was on the subject of our involvement in Vietnam by Major General William DePuy, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, JCS. It was a balanced, analytical presentation of the various factors and considerations we have to deal with. This lecture was on the last day of the Conference and it was followed with an excellent one by Sherman Kent on the Intelligence Community and its contribution to the national security.

5. But in many ways the highlight of the conference was a presentation by Governor Harriman. He followed immediately after General Greene, Commandant of the Marine Corps, who gave a very frank, off-the-record appraisal of our military situation in Vietnam. In effect, he made a rather eloquent plea for raising our military commitment including a need for bombing Haiphong harbor and if necessary the ships entering it. Governor Harriman gave a wide-ranging coverage of developments world-wide, including reference to his talks in Moscow two years ago with Premier Kosygin. At that time Kosygin reportedly stated the Soviets would like a settlement of the issues in Vietnam as our involvement there was weakening Soviet leadership - and conversely strengthening Chinese leadership - of international communism. Almost as if on cue, Governor Harriman then addressed himself to those officials within the Government who would like to see our military commitment raised in Vietnam, strongly disagreeing with the measures they advocated as being necessary to win the war. Governor Harriman went on to elaborate that among other things they wanted the bombing of Haiphong harbor.

6. During the question period Governor Harriman was able to underscore his views under somewhat unusual circumstances, to say the least. One of the conferees asked if it really were not to the Soviets' advantage to keep us involved in Vietnam rather than otherwise, as had been suggested. This query triggered an impassioned outburst - "if I can get it through your thick skull, I'll be glad to go

over it again. . . " Governor Harriman then asked, "Suppose we do raise our military commitment and do everything that is advocated, then what? Can our military then tell us what it will lead to or where it will stop? No they can't!" He concluded by observing that we are fighting a limited war, with limited political objectives, and that fortunately the President sees it this way and that so far as he was concerned he would do everything within his power to support the President in this view.

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Note: The above set of circumstances created a very delicate situation which Ambassador Kidder managed to handle quite deftly. Toward the conclusion of the Conference Ambassador Kidder requested the conferees to consider what they had heard as being privileged and cautioned them against repeating it outside.